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Antitrust Law—Sherman Act—Attorneys' Minimum Fee Schedules
—Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar' —Petitioners, Mr. & Mrs. Goldfarb,
were required to obtain a title examination by the mortagee in con-
junction with their purchase of a house in Fairfax County, Virginia.
In Virginia, such an examination must be performed by a member of
the Virginia State Bar." When they could not find an attorney who
would perform the title examination for less than the minimum pre-
scribed in the Fairfax County Bar Association fee schedule, 3 the Gold-
farbs brouight a class action under section 1 of the Sherman Act 4 seek-
ing damages" and injunctive relief' against the Fairfax County and
Virginia State Bar Associations, They alleged "that the operation of
the minimum fee schedule, as applied to fees for legal services relat-
ing to residential real estate transactions" constituted price fixing in
violation of the Sherman Act.'
The district court held that the minimum fee schedule, as
promulgated by the County Bar Association' and as enforced by the
State Bar Association," did indeed constitute price fixing under sec-
tion 1." However, the court found that under the "state action" doc-
trine of Parker v. Brown" the State Bar Association was immune from
antitrust liability."
' 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
2 1d. at 775. Petitioner Lewis H. Goldfarb was an attorney for the Federal Trade
Commission but could nut perlOrm the title examination himself, because he was not
licensed to practice in Virginia. Statement of Lewis H. Goldfarb, Hearings on Legal Fees Refire
the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizens Interests qf the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 84 (1973).
421 U.S. 776-78. The petitioners had contacted thirty-seven Fairfax County attor-
neys, of whom twenty (all who replied) felt obliged to adhere to the minimum fee set forth by
the County Bar Association. Id, The fee for title examinations was set at a minimum of 1% of
the loan or purchase price, whichever was greater, plus one-hall of 1% from $50,000 to
$100,000 and one-quarter of 1% from $100,000 to $1,000,000, above which the amount was
negotiable. Brief for Petitioners at 6.
-1 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) provides in pertinent part that lelvery contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
o 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) provides for damages for section 1 violations.
o 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970) provides for injunctive relief from section 1 violations.
7 421 U.S. at 778.
" Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491, 498 (E.D. Va. 1973). The fee
schedule had been adopted.in 1969 by the Fairfax County Bar Association "in conjunction
with the bar associations of Loudoun and Arlington counties and the City of Alexandria."
Brief for Petitioners at 6.
"355 F. Supp. at 496. See VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASS'N COMM. ON LEGAL ETitics,
OPINIONS. No. 98 (1960); VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSN COMM. ON LEGAL ETHICS, OPINIONS,
No. 170 (1971) concerning the possibility of disciplinary actions with respect to depar-
tures from the minimum fee standards:
10 355 F. Supp. at 492-94.
'' 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Under the Parker doctrine, restraints of trade do not violate
the Sherman Act where they (I) derive their "authority and efficacy from the legislative
command of the state," id. at 350, (2) are "not intended to operate or become effective
without that command," id., and (3) are adopted and enforced by the state in the "execution
of a governmental policy," id. at 352.
12 355 F. Supp. at 496.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that both bar associations were immune from Sherman Act liability."
After affirming the State Bar Association's immunity under Parker,"
the Fourth Circuit found that the County Bar Association was also
immune because the promulgation of a fee schedule by a "learned
profession" does not constitute "trade or commerce" within the mean-
ing of the Act." Alternatively, the Fourth Circuit found that the ef-
fect of the bar associations' activities on interstate commerce was in-
sufficient to support Sherman Act jurisdiction."
In an 8-0 decision" the Supreme Court reversed," and HELD:
The County Bar Association's minimum fee schedule and the State
Bar Association's enforcement mechanism constitute illegal price
fixing." The Court utilized a four-step analysis in concluding that the
bar associations' activities violated section 1. First, the Court found
that such activities constituted a "classic illustration of price fixing.' ,20
Second, the Court determined that a substantial volume of interstate
commerce was involved since a "significant" portion of funds had
been furnished, and a "significant" amount of loans guaranteed, for
real estate within Fairfax County, Virginia by persons outside the
state." The jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act were met
through the "inseparability" of attorneys' title examinations from the
interstate aspects of real estate transactions. 22
Third, the Court found that as a commercial transaction, the ex-
change of money for an attorney's title examination was not free
from Sherman Act liability under a broad "learned profession" ex-
emption from the antitrust laws. 23 Congress, in fashioning the Sher-
man Act, had "intended to strike as broadly as it could" against com-
binations in restraint of trade. 24 The Court reasoned that a broad
"learned profession" exemption would frustrate this intent, since at-
torneys, if exempt from all antitrust scrutiny, "would be able to adopt
anticompetitive practices with impunity." 25 In addition, the Court re-
fused to carve out a specific exemption with respect to the bar associa-
' 3 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 12-15 (4th Cir. 1974).
14 1d. at 12.
"Id. at 14-15.
"id. at 18.
"Justice Powell, past president of the Virginia State Bar Association, took no part in
the decision. 421 U.S. at 793.
" Id. The Court remanded for a determination of the State Bar Association's conten-
tion that it is protected from monetary liability by the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 792
n.22; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-71 (1974).
421 U.S. at 783, 793.
2" /d. at 783. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392,
397-99 (1927).
" 421 U.S. at 783.
"Id. at 783-85.
"Id. at 787.
" Id.
25 Id, at 787-88.
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tions' "fee control" activities because. such activities were not suffi-
ciently related to the general professional goal of "providing services
necessary to the community." 2 °
Fourth, the Court found that the Parker doctrine27 was inapplic-
able since neither the County Bar Association's promulgation nor the
State Bar Association's enforcement of the minimum fee schedule was
compelled by the state of Virginia." The bar associations' activities in
Goldfarb were not required by state law; "at most their activities com-
plemented the objectives" of the Virginia Supreme Court's ethical
codes," which merely "mention" the propriety of an attorney's use of
advisory fee schedules for "some guidance" in fee setting. 3 ° Since the
codes did not "direct" either respondent to supply the fee schedule,
the respondents' activities were not compelled by the state as required
under the Parker doctrine." In addition, since the State Bar Associa-
tion had provided a mechanism for enforcing the fee schedule, the
Court concluded that it had "voluntarily joined in what is essentially a
private anticompetitive activity." 32 As a result, the fee control activities
of the State Bar Association in Goldfarb were found not to be beyond
the reach of section 1. 33 In summary, through its four-step analysis,
the Court concluded that the bar associations' voluntary activities con-
stituted a price fixing violation of the Sherman Act. 34
Prior to Goldfarb, the Court had never been faced with the issue
of whether the legal profession is exempt from the antitrust laws of
the United States. 35 However, due to its determination in Goldfarb that
certain types of minimum fee schedules promulgated by the legal pro-
fession violate section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Court has opened
the activities of the legal and other "learned professions" to antitrust
scrutiny. 32 This note will first discuss the Supreme Court's determina-
tion that the bar associations' activities in Goldfarb constituted a "classic
illustration of price fixing." The Court's refusal to grant a broad
Sherman Act exemption to the commercial activities of the "learned
professions," and its consideration and rejection of a specific Sherman
2" Id. at 786. The Court's consideration of the general professional goal of the
legal profession lays the foundation, however, for possible Sherman Act exemptions for
"professional" activities other than "lee control" activities. See id. at 787-88 n.17. See
text at notes 94-102 infra,
27 See note 11 supra.
"421 U.S. at 791.
25 Id.
"See id. at 788-91.
31 421 U.S. at 790-91.
32 Id, at 791-92.
33 1d. at 791.
34 Id. at 793.
35 See id. at 786 n.15. See also Coleman, The Learned Professions, 33 ABA ANTITRUST
L.J. 48 (1967); Comment, The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other
"Non-Commercial" Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 313 (1972).
36 Axinn, Warning to Lawyers in 'Goldfarb' Ruling, 174 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1975); see
Goldstein, Advertising is Less of a Taboo Now in the Learned Professions, N.Y. Times, Dec.
28, 1975, sec. 4 at 12, col. 3.
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Act exemption for .bar association "fee control" activities, will then be
analyzed. Finally, the validity under the Sherman Act of the legal
profession's price advertising restrictions" will be evaluated under the
analysis utilized by the Court in determining the validity of the bar as-
sociations' direct fee control activities in Goldfarb.
I. MINIMUM FEE SCHEDULES AS A "CLASSIC ILLUSTRATION" OF
SHERMAN ACT PRICE FIXING
Price fixing exists where competitors combine, contract, or con-
spire for the purpose or with the effect of "raising, depressing, fixing,
pegging, or stabilizing" market price. 38 Price fixing arrangements in in-
terstate commerce constitute per se violations of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act" for which no defense of reasonableness of the restraint,"" or
37
 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. DR 2-101, DR 2-102, and DR 2-105.
See text at notes 114-119 infra.
33
 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). Purpose
and effect need not both be shown; a finding of either alone is sufficient to sustain a
determination of per se illegality. Id. at 224-26 n.59; Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 257 U.S. 377, 400 (1921). See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393
U.S. 333, 337 (1969); Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 447 F.2d 713, 716 (7th Cir.
1971), affd, 409 U.S. 289 (1973). But see Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Coleman Oil Co., 470
F.2d 925, 930-31 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973).
3
 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). Under sec-
tion I, agreements which restrain trade or commerce are classified by degree. See L.
SCH wArurz, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 12-13 (4th ed. 1972). The clas-
sification process determines the standards by which the validity of agreements which
are alleged to restrain trade is tested. Id. Per se violations are considered to be so egre-
gious in nature and to have such a pernicious effect on competition that they are con-
clusively presumed to be unreasonable; such per se violations of section I include collec-
tive boycotts, divisions of markets, tying arrangements, and price fixing. See Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1969) (tying ar-
rangement); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 358 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing) (division of markets); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146-48
(1966) (collective boycott); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207,
210-12 (1959) (collective boycott); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5-8
(1958) (tying arrangement). See also the price fixing cases cited in note 38 supra.
The validity of all other agreements is determined under the "rule of reason,"
which requires a thorough examination of the nature and effects of the restraint and of
the reasons, if any, for its existence. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365, 380-81 (1967); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 486.501, 512
(1940); Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
18 United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 308-10 (1956). ("[P]rice
fixing is contrary to the policy of competition underlying the Sherman Act and ... its
illegality does not depend on a showing of its unreasonableness, since it is conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable." Id. at 309-10.) See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392,
397-98 (1927).
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good motive of the price fixers, 4 ' is considered.42
The sine qua nan of all section 1 violations—an agreement among
competitors"—was found to exist in Goldfarb in the attorneys' joint
activity as members of the bar associations.44 Attorneys, as actual or
potential competitors, had combined to form the respondent bar as-
sociations which had promulgated and set up the mechanism for en-
forcing the minimum fee schedule.'" The Court then examined the
effect of their agreement and determined that the agreement placed
an actual restraint upon trade, since it pegged the minimum market
price for title examinations. The Court found that the petitioners
were faced with "a fixed, rigid price floor" in their attempt to obtain a
title examination." The Court noted that none of the twenty attor-
neys who had responded to the petitioners' request for such an ex-
amination would charge less than the fee provided by the minimum
schedule.'" Moreover, even though ethical opinions of the State Bar
allowed for deviations from the minimum fee where a lower charge
appears justified," none of the attorneys approached by the Gold-
farbs asked for any additional information with which to set an indi-
vidualized fee." Thus, once having found an agreement among com-
petitors which had the effect of pegging a market price, the Court
was squarely faced with a price fixing arrangement. 5 °
" White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 262 (1963), quoting Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225-28 (1940). See United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351
U.S. 305, 310 (1956).
" For a discussion of the rationale for fee schedules see, e.g., A mould & Corley, Fee
Schedules Should Be Abolished, 57 A.B.A. J. 655 (1971); Comment, Bar Association Fee Schedules
And Suggested Alternatives: Reflections On A Sherman Exemption That Doesn't Exist, '3 U.C.
ALAS. L. REV. 207, 238-43 (1974); Comment, 1968 Wisc. L. REV. 1237, 1238-40. For an
economic analysis of the use of fee schedules by the legal profession see Note, 85 1'1 A RV.
L. REV. 971, 974-81 (1972).
43 See L. SCH WART/., FREE ENTERPRISE A NO ECONOM IC ORGANIZATION 1 1 el h ed. 1972).
" 421 U.S. at 782.
43 See id.
43 See id. at 781, 782 n.9. At least one econometric study has demonstrated that the
legal profession's minimum fee schedules have an actual price effect. See A mould & Corley,
supra note 42, at 657-71.
" See 421 U.S. at 781, 782 n.9.
4 " Vim:iron STATE 13AR ASSN COM M. ON LEGAL. ETHICS, OPINIONS No, 98 (1960)
provides:
each lawyer has both a right and an ethical duty to charge a fee lower thim
that recited in a minimum fee schedtile where the time required for the
particular service, and its value, are themselves minimal, or where the
poverty of a client, or other proper ethical consideration justifies such
lower charge.
" 421 U.S. at 781. It is difficult to conceive, however, what additional information the
Court expected the attorneys to obtain. A title examination is a standard procedure. The
Goldfarbs could hardly have been poverty-stricken: the minimum fee with which they were
faced was $522.50, Brief for Petitioners at 6, which corresponds to a purchase price of
approximately $54,500. See note 8 supra.
"421 U.S. at 783.
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Respondents claimed, however, that despite the potential for
price fixing, the fee schedule was purely advisory." Nevertheless, the
Court found that the schedule dealt with prices to be charged in fu-
ture transactions and was enforceable through either "the desire of at-
torneys to comply with announced professional norms,"" or the
prospect of the State Bar Association's discipline of those attorneys
who "habitually charge less than the minimum fee." 53
 Therefore, the
Court concluded that "a naked agreement was clearly shown." 54
It is unfortunate, nonetheless, that the Court even considered
the advisory nature of the minimum fee schedule, as a finding that
the fee schedule was not advisory was wholly unnecessary to support
the Court's traditional price fixing determination. Even a purely ad-
visory fee schedule would appear to constitute price fixing where, as
in Goldfarb, it placed an actual restraint upon trade." In United States
v. Container Corp. of America" the Court was faced with a reciprocal
agreement among container producers merely to exchange recent,
particularized price information." The Court held that the agreement
was a section 1 price fixing violation even though the producers could
withdraw from the agreement at any time, 58
 because the result of the
agreement was price uniformity in the industry." No .question of the
advisory nature of the information exchanged by the producers was
entertained by the Court; the fact that the agreement was unenforce-
able was deemed irrelevant." Thus, in light of Container Corp., once the
Court in Goldfarb determined that the result of the bar associations'
activities was a "fixed, rigid price floor,"" those activities constituted
price fixing even if the minimum fee schedule had been completely
advisory. B2
" Id. at 781-82.
• 56 Id. at 781.
55
 Id. at 777-78, 781.
54 See id. at 782.
's See id. at 781.
56 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
" Id. at 335.
" Id.
55 Id. at 336-38. But see id. at 338-40 (Fortas, J., concurring in the Court's judgment but
finding no per se violation of the Act).
°' See td. at 335-38.
61
 421 U.S. at 781.
62 See 393 U.S. at 335.38. In American Column & Lumber Co. v. Unite(' States, 257
U.S. 377 (1921), the Court found a price effect and thus a section I price fixing violation
even though no formal mechanism existed to penalize those who strayed from the desired
norm. Id. at 411-12. In United States v. National Ass'ri of Real Estate lids., 339 U.S. 485
(1950), the Court also found a price fixing violation even though, as in Goldfarb, previous
departures from rates set by the Board had resulted in none of the sanctions which it was
authorized to impose. Id. at 488-89. Moreover, the fact that Container Corp. concerned
information on present market conditions, whereas Goldfarb concerned future market
conditions, lends even more credence to this position because the exchange of present
market information may be held valid whereas the exchange of future market information
will not. Compare Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 586 (1925) with
United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 US. 485, 488 (1950).
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It is also unfortunate that the Court in Goldfarb examined the
extent of harm that the fee schedule caused consumers. The Court
found that no alternatives were available to the petitioners from which
to obtain the title examination." As a result, the Court concluded that
the restraint on competition and the resultant harm to consumers
were "unusually damaging."' Ordinarily however, an examination of
neither the combination's power to fix prices nor the extent of harm
to the consumer is necessary to a section I price fixing determination,
because "tilt is the 'contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint
of trade or commerce' which [section 1] strikes clown," not the power
or success of those who engage in the activity."
The Court's examination of whether the bar associations could
effectively fix prices and the degree of harm which would develop
therefrom, when viewed in conjunction with the Court's analysis of
the non-advisory nature of the fee schedule, might be perceived as es-
tablishing a standard for proving the presence of price fixing in the
legal profession higher than that which would be applied in an ordi-
nary business context." This interpretation of the Court's price fixing
determination in Goldfarb appears unsupportable, however, in light of
the Court's conclusion that the bar associations' activities constituted a
"classic illustration of price fixing."" 7 Thus, it appears that the .Court
itself believed that it was applying ordinary section I standards to the
legal profession. It is submitted that the Court's discussion of these
factors—advisory nature and consumer harm—should be interpreted
merely as dicta buttressing its traditional section 1 price fixing conclu-
sion rather than as the implementation of a higher standard for the
legal profession."
11. EXEMPTION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION FROM SECTION
Prior to Goldfarb, the United States Supreme Court had never
A determination of purpose appears to heroine relevant beyond rnere buttressing
evidence of an unreasonable restraint Of trade only where there is no finding that the actual
effect of the agreement is a restraint upon trade. Where the purpose of.the.agreetnent is to
restrain trade, such an agreement violates section 1. See United States v. Gasoline Retailers
Ass!n. Inc„ 285 F.2d 688, 690-91 (7th Cir. 1961), However, where the purpose is actually to
,foster competition Through increased knowledge of market conditions such an agreement
dues not violate the Act. See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563,
582-86 (1925).
421 U.S. at 782.
64 Id, at 782-83.
66 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-26 n.59 (1940).
66 This possible higher standard should 'be distinguished front the limited profes-
sional activities exemption discussed in text at notes 92-.102 route.
" See 421 U.S. at 781-83.
68 The Court previously has made.similar observations to buttress price fixing deter-
minations. See, e.g., American Column & Lumber Co. v. United Stalei, 257 U.S. at 400,
411-12.
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been faced squarely with the issue of whether the practice of attor-
neys, as the practice of a learned profession, constitutes activities ex-
empt from section 1 of the Sherman Act." The Court had, however,
denied Sherman Act exemptions in cases with similar issues involving
the commercial activities of real estate brokerage," news
distribution," insurance,'" theatrical production," pharmacology,' 4
and sports's other than baseball." Similar issues had also been
avoided in two cases involving the medical profession!' In Goldfarb,
however, the Court was left no alternative but to decide the learned
profession exemption issue once it had found that the bar associa-
tions' price fixing activities sufficiently affected interstate commerce's
and were not immune as state action."
Although there is dicta prior to Goldfarb which might support a
broad learned profession exemption," the Court determined in
Goldfarb that the learned professions were not completely excluded
from section 1 proscriptions." The Court concluded that the com-
mercial activities of the legal profession should be distinguished from
the non-commercial in considering the applicability of the Sherman
Act." Thus, faced with a restraint which operated directly upon a
commercial activity of the legal profession—fee setting—the Court
refused to exempt the profession from the antitrust laws."
The foundation of this analysis appears to lie in the Court's un-
equivocal affirmation of general .antitrust policies: Congress intended
"3" 421 U.S. at 786. See also Coleman, The Learned Profession, 33 ABA ANTITRUST
L.J. 48 (1967); Comment, The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other
"Non-commercial" Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 313 (1972).
" United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 490 (1950).
71 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1945).
72
 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553-61
(1944).
" United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 230-31 (1955).
" United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29, 33 (D. Utah),aff'd per
curiam, 371 U.S. 24 (1962); cf. Northern Calif. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306
F.2d 379, 383-84 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962).
rs Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 449-52 (1957); United States
v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 241-44 (1953).
" Baseball is an "exception and an anomaly," Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-84
(1972).
" American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1943); see F.T.C. v.
Raladatn Co., 283 U.S. 643, 652-53 (1931).
" See 42I U.S. at 785.
" Id, at 790-92.
" See United States v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952) (dicta) ("This
Court has recognized that forms of competition in the business world may be demoralizing
to the ethical standards ()fa profession."); F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931)
(dicta) ("Of course, medical practitioners are not in competition with the respondent.
They follow a profession and not a trade .. .."); ef. Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Den-
tal Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1938).
"' 421 U.S. at 786-87.
" 2 Id. at 787-88.
22 Id.
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to bring within the ambit of the Sherman Act "every person engaged
in business whose activities might restrain or monopolize commercial
intercourse."84 Adhering to this broad policy, the Court decided that
it should neither infer" nor construct an antitrust exemption for the
legal profession's commercial activities since Congress had not ex-
pressly exempted the profession from antitrust proscriptions. 88 The
Court concluded that the nature of the legal profession "standing
alone" should not provide any unique sanctuary from the Sherman
Act. 87
Initially, the respondents in Goldfarb contended that the exis-
tence of state regulation exempted the legal profession from section 1
scrutiny. 88 The Court rejected this argument since its adoption would
have allowed attorneys to employ "anticompetitive practices with
impunity."8 °
The respondents then argued that the application of section 1 to
the legal profession would place other restrictions on the practice of
law in jeopardy of falling under the antitrust laws." The Court ap-
pears to have circumvented this argument by specifically limiting its
holding to the "fee control" activities with which it was confronted)"
Third, and most important, the respondents argued that the
competition which would be stimulated if section 1 were applied to
the legal profession is "inconsistent with the practice of a profession,"
because the goal of professional activities, unlike that of ordinary
businesses, is to provide "services necessary to the community" and
not to enhance profit. 52 In response, the Court laid the foundation
for treating antitrust issues involving the commercial activities of the
"I Id., quoting United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553
(1944).
"a 421 U.S. at 787.
" See id. at 787-88; cf. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S.
533, 561 (1944). For several of the exemptionS expressly provided by Congress see L.
tiwnwrz, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 13-14 (4th ed. 1972).
" 421 U.S. at 787.
"" Id.. at 785-87. The state regulation argument should be distinguished from the state
actions argument discussed in text at notes 27.34 supra. State regulation is argued where the
defendant claims that his activities are controlled by the state and thus exempt from section
I; state action is argued where the defendant claims that his activities are those of the state, or
are compelled by the state, and thus immune from section 1. Compare Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at
785-87 with Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943).
"" 421 U.S. at 787.
"° Brief for Respondent Fairfax County Bar Association at 34-36. The other restric-
tions on the legal profession referred to by the County Bar Association are restrictions on
advertising, soliciting, fee-splitting for referrals, pricing on a contingent basis in crimi-
nal cases, and charging what the traffic will bear. /d. at 34-35. In addition, the County
Bar Association claimed that antitrust scrutiny of monopolization by attorneys, under
section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), and of the establishment of part-
nerships and the amalgamation of law firms by attorneys, under section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), would result from the initial application of section
1. Brief, supra, at 35.
" See 421 U.S. at 787-88 n.17.
" See 421 U.S. at 786.
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legal profession differently than those of ordinary businesses." The
different treatment entails examination of the general goal of profes-
sional activities to determine whether an activity otherwise violative of
the Sherman Act should be exempt from the Act because engaged in
by a profession.'"
The Court noted that even if the general goal of professional ac-
tivities is to provide necessary services and not to enhance profit, this
argument "loses some of its force when used to support the fee control
activities involved here;" 98
 had the bar associations truly been con-
cerned with providing necessary services they would not have pre-
vented competition among attorneys which might have lowered the
cost and increased the availability of title examinations." The Court
thus concluded that the relationship between the bar associations' fee
control activities and the general goal of professional activities was in-
sufficient to exempt the fee control activities from section 1. The
Court's analysis therefore appears to leave open the possibility that
the Court would exempt from section 1 a commercial activity of the
legal profession which has a sufficient nexus to the general profes-
sional goal of providing necessary services.
The Court's approach in Goldfarb is a departure from the tradi-
tional approach taken in price fixing cases." Since price fixing is con-
sidered a per se violation of section 1, the Court generally will not con-
sider the goal or purpose of the price fixers' activities. It is black letter
law that an activity falling within the per se category of Sherman Act
violations will not be saved by the good motives of the violators. 98 Yet,
not once in its opinion did the Court mention the term per se even
though it was dealing with price fixing. This apparently deliberate
omission, in addition to the Court's consideration of the general goal
of professional activities, indicates a unique departure from estab-
lished section 1 price fixing analysis where the activities of the legal
profession are involved. It is suggested that Goldfarb acknowledges a
fortiori the existence of a limited legal profession exemption to the an-
titrust laws.
The Court's professional goal analysis in Goldfarb is not merely
an application of the traditional "rule of reason" analysis to an other-
wise per se violation of section 1. Rule of reason analysis requires a
thorough examination of the nature and effects of the restraint and
of the justifications for its existence before a violation may be said to
"See id.
See id.
"Id. at 786 (emphasis added).
"See id. at 786 n.16 where the Court wryly noted that "[t]he reason for [the bar
association's] adopting the fee schedule does not appear to have been wholly altruistic," since
the State Bar Association's fee schedule report was introduced with the observation that
"[t]he lawyers have slowly, but surely, been committing economic suicide as a profession."Id.
"See text & notes 38-42 supra.
" See note 41 supra.
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exist." The Court in Goldfarb, however, did not make a thorough ex-
amination of the reasonableness of the bar associations' activities.
Rather, the Court considered whether the bar associations' activities
constituted section 1 price fixing under its ordinary standards, and
then examined whether the relationship between those activities and
the general goal of professional activities was sufficient to exempt the
activities from Sherman Act proscription.'" Moreover, under the rule
of reason approach courts examine only the reasons underlying the
activities specifically alleged to violate section 1, not the goal of the
defendants' activities generally, to determine whether the former ac-
tivities violate the Act.'"
It thus appears that the Court has adopted a hybrid approach to
determine the section 1 validity of activities of the legal profession.
This hybrid is basically a two-step test in which the Court first ex-
amines whether the activities specifically alleged to violate the Act
would constitute a per se violation of the Act under the Court's tradi-
tional approach. Second, the Court determines whether those ac-
tivities are sufficiently related to the general goal of professional ac-
tivities to warrant exemption from section 1 proscription. 102
111. THE SECTION 1 VALIDITY OF PRICE ADVERTISING'"
RESTRICTION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Even though the Court explicitly limited its consideration in
"" See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380.81 (1967); Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U,S. 469, 486-501, 512 (1940); Board of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58
(1911).
10 ' See 421 U.S. at 781-83, 786.
"" See cases cited at note 104 supra.
"1 See id. at 786. This analysis of the Court's two-step "professional activities" ap-
proach to section 1 finds further support in the Court's statement that:
It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchange-
able with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the profes-
sions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service
aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular
practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act
in another context, he treated differently.
Id, at 787-88 n.17 (emphasis added).
"1 As used in this note, the term, "price advertising," encompasses activities in
interstate commerce effecting the disseminatiOn of information regarding price and
type of services offered, and the name and location of the attorney, firm, or legal ser-
vice making the advertisement. For examples of advertisements suggested for the legal
profession, which go beyond mere price advertising, see J. Wilson, Madison Avenue, Meet
the Bar, 61 A,B.A.1, 586, 586-87 (1975).
The price advertising restrictions may run afoul not only of the antitrust laws, but also
of the First Amendment. Cotnment, Solicitation by the Second Oldest Profession: Attorneys and
Advertising, 8 HARV. Civ, RIGI-Irs-Ctv, LIB. L, REV. 77, 85-91 (1973); Comment, Advertising,
Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Mahe Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 118 I , 1185-91
(1972); Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Association and Courts, 51-Imtv. Rturrs-Ci v.
Lilt. L. REV. 301, 348-78 (1970). First Amendment considerations are beyond the scope
of this note.
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Goldfarb to minimum fee schedules,' 64 the fact that it applied section 1
of the Sherman Act to the legal profession has opened various other
activities of the profession to antitrust scrutiny.' 05 Moreover,. in light
of complaints recently filed to enjoin allegedly restrictive activities of
professions other than the legal profession,'" it appears likely that re-
strictive practices of the legal profession soon will undergo antitrust
scrutiny in areas other than direct fee control.'" One of the restric-
tions placed on the legal profession which warrants close scrutiny is
that concerned with price advertising. 1 U"
The American Bar Association prohibits most forms of "com-
mercial" advertising by members of the legal profession.'" In the
past, courts have assumed the validity of such advertising restrictions
and have readily applied sanctions against attorneys who violate
them."" Moreover, when forced to consider the validity of such re-
strictions, the courts generally have upheld them on the basis of the
learned profession rationale-that attorneys practice a profession and
not a trade, and thus may be treated differently than "ordinary"
businesses.'" However, the Supreme Court refused to make the
profession/trade distinction dispositive of the validity of the bar as-
sociations' fee control activities in Goldfarb." 2 It is submitted that the
distinction alone may no longer support the legal profession's price
advertising restrictions, and that the validity of those restrictions now
must be analyzed under the "professional activities" approach to sec-
don I provided by the Court in Goldfarb. "a First, the question of
whether the purpose or effect of the profession's price advertising re-
strictions would constitute a price fixing violation of section 1 if en-
gaged in by "ordinary" businesses will be considered. Next, the ques-
tion of whether the price advertising restrictions are sufficiently re-
'" 421 U.S. at 787-88 n.17.
Axinn, Warning to Lawyers in 'Goldfarb' Ruling, 174	 1 (1975);see Goldstein,
Advertising is Less of a Taboo Now in the Learned Professions, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1975, sec. 4 at
12, col. 3.
1 "" See N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1975, sec. 4 at 12, col. 1; Wall Street Journal, Dec. 24,
1975, at 2, col. 3; Boston Globe, Dec. 23, 1975, at 2, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1975, at 2,
col. 4; Wall Street Journal, Nov. 25, 1975, at 2, col. 3.
'" See Goldstein, Advertising Is Less of a Taboo Now in the Learned Professions, NJ' • Times,
Dec. 28, 1975, sec. 4 at 12, col. 3.
"'" See id. See also authorities cited at note 106 supra.
' 11 " ABA CODE or PROFESSIONAL Rr.sroNsitsitsrv, DR 2-101. See id. DR 2-102, 1)R
2-105.
II " Libarian v. State Bar, 21 Cal. 2d 862, 863.66, 136 P.2d 321, 322-23 (1943); Mayer
v. State Bar, 2 Cal.2d 71, 73-75, 39 P.2d 206, 207.08 (1934); It, re Donovan, 43 S.D. 98,
102-05, 178 N.W. 143, 144-45 (1920); In re Neuman. 169 App. Div. 638, 639-41, 155 N.Y.S.
428, 429-31 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
'" See In re Cohen, 261 Mass.484,487-88,159 N.E. 495,496-97 (1945); in re Kamp, 40
N.J. 588, 597-99, 194 A.2(1. 236, 241-42 (1963); In re Rothman, 12 N.J. 528, 547-53, 97 A.2d
621, 631-35 (1953); In re Schwarz, 175 App. Div. 335, 342-45, 161 N.Y.S. 1079, 1083-85
(Sup. Ct. 1916), affd, 231 N.Y. 642, 132 N.E. 921 (1921).
01 421 U.S. at 787.
"3 The "professional activities" approach is discussed in text at notes 97-108 supra.
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lated to the profession's general goal of providing services necessary
to the community to warrant exemption under section I will be
analyzed.
In the leading price fixing case, United States v. Socony
- Vacuum Oil
Co.," 4 the Court found that an agreement among major oil com-
panies to remove a portion of the gasoline supply from the retail
market through the purchase of the surplus production of smaller,
independent companies violated section l." 6 The oil companies had
not directly fixed the price of gasoline in Socony- Vacuum since no ex-
press agreement to sell at or above a specified price existed." 6
Nonetheless, the Court found that their agreement to purchase the
surplus gasoline was a per se price fixing violation of the Sherman Act
because it had both the purpose and the effect of "tampering" with
the price structure of the industry."'
In United States v. Gasoline Retailers Association, Inc., "8 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that an agree-
ment by major and independent gasoline station operators to refrain
from price advertising or premium distribution in conjunction with
retail gasoline sales and to limit price advertising by major brand sta-
tions violated section 1. 14
 The court found that the agreement
amounted to price fixing and was therefore illegal per se under the
Act."'" The Seventh Circuit read Socony - Vacuum expansively for the
proposition that "any concerted scheme designed to affect prices" is
price fixing and hence unlawful per se. 121
 Since the advertising restric-
tions proposed to eliminate price wars which had threatened the in-
dustry, the court found that the objective of the agreement was to
limit price competition and thereby affect prices in the retail gasoline
market. 122
 Thus, under the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of
Socony - Vacuum, a finding that the purpose of advertising restrictions is
to limit price competition is sufficient to support a section 1 price fix-
ing determination. 123
The reasoning of the Seventh Circuit seems justified, since price
advertising restrictions limit one form of the competition which the
Sherman Act serves to foster.'" Even where illegal effects of the re-
'" 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
" 5 Id. at 210-24.
1 " Id. at 222-23.
117 See id. at 222-24.
"" 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961).
"a Id. at 689-91.
u° See id. at 690-91.
121 1d. at 691 (emphasis added).
122 Id.
"2 See id.
124
 See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969). See
generally United States v. Topco Associates, inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1970) where the Court stated
that "the freedom guaranteed each and every business [under the antitrust laws] ... is thé
freedom to compete—to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever
economic muscle it can muster." Id. at 610. cf Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1 (1945), where the Court stated that "[t]he Sherman Act was specifically intended
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strictions are not shown, an illegal purpose alone should suffice to
condemn the agreement because section 1 strikes down agreements in
restraint of trade or commerce whether they are "wholly nascent or
abortive on the one hand, or successful on the other." 125
Gasoline Retailers was distinguished, however, in Arizona v. Cook
Paint & Varnish Co.' 26 There, the district court was confronted with a
false advertising agreement among competitors to misrepresent the
flammability characteristics of their products."' The court concurred
in the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Socony - Vacuum,'" but re-
fused to find the false advertising agreement a section I violation be-
cause there was no showing that an "actual purpose" of the agreement
was to affect prices.' 29 The court refused to "break new ground by
recognizing a doctrine of constructive price fixing in cases where a
natural and probable effect, thought [sic] not an actual purpose, of
the conspiracy or combination is to affect prices [since) the range of
conduct embraced by such a doctrine is almost limitless."'"
The American Bar Association has stated that a purpose of the
advertising restrictions placed on the legal profession is to preserve
public confidence in the legal system "by strict, self-imposed controls
over, rather than by unlimited, advertising.""' However, the ABA's
blanket proscriptions against nearly all forms of advertising,'" rather
than Only abusive advertising,'" suggest that it is competition and not
Merely abusive advertising at which the legal profession's advertising
restrictions aim.
to prohibit businesses from becoming 'associates' in a common plan which is bound to
reduce their competitor's opportunity to buy or sell things in which the groups com-
pete." Id. at 15.
Of course, were theoretically "perfect" competition the rule there would be no
need for advertising since consumers would have "perfect" knowledge of all market
conditions. j. BACKNIAN, AovEtcrisiNc; AND CostwirrioN 34-36 (1967); W. McInnes, The
Economic Functions of Law and Advertising, in F. QUINN, ETHICS, ADVERTISING AND
RESPONSIBILITY 58-59 (1963).
"5 See Socony- Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 224-26 n.59.
128 391 F. Supp. 962, 966 (I). Ariz. 1975).
"7 Id. at 965.
128 See id. at 966 n.2.
128 Id. at 966. It should be noted that the courts have used various terminology,
apparently interchangeably, to describe the "purpose" of an agreement. See, e.g.,
SOcoity - Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 216 ("direct purpose and aim"); American Column & Lumber
Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411 (1921) ("fundamental purpose"); National
Macaroni Mfgs. Ass'n v. F.T.C., 345 F.2d 421, 426 (7th Cir. 1965) ("intended"); Gasoline
Retailers. 285 F.2d at 691 ("basic objective").
'" 391 F. Supp. at 966.
131 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  EC 2-9.
"2 Id.
` 33 The rationale underlying the purported purpose for which the ABA restricts
advertising by the legal profession appears to lie in its fear of the deleterious effects
advertising abuses in the legal service market would have upon public confidence in the legal
system as a whole. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-9. The underlying
rationale is twofold: with no advertising restrictions (I) attorneys "would be apt to publish
the most extravagant and alluring material about themselves" thus misleading the public;
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Nevertheless, a price fixing violatiOn is not proved simply be-
cause a purpose of the agreement is to limit competition in general.
Rather, it must be shown that a purpose is to limit price competition,
thereby affecting prices. 134 In Gasoline Retailers the court inferred a
purpose to affect prices among the Gasoline Retailer Association's
members from its finding that the agreement had a purpose of limit-
ing price competition.'" It would appear that the legal profession's
present, broad advertising restrictions are aimed at limiting price ad-
vertising and therefore price competition among members of the legal
profession. Therefore, under the Gasoline Retailers rationale the legal
profession's price advertising restrictions , would constitute a Sherman
I price fixing violation within the context of an ordinary business.
Consideration must still be given, however, to whether the rela-
tion between the advertising restrictions and the legal profession's
general goal of providing services necessary to the community is suffi-
cient to exempt the restrictions from section 1 under the limited "pro-
fessional activities" approach developed in Goldfarb.'" It is submitted
that the price advertising restrictions not only are not sufficiently re-
lated to the provision of necessary legal services, but actually exist in
contradiction to that goal. The advertising restrictions reduce "the
flow of information to laymen concerning their legal rights, [and
impair] their ability to choose a lawyer intelligently . _ 137 There
would seem to be no better way for the legal profession to provide
necessary services than to let the public know that the services exist by
advertising the price and type of service, and the name and location
of the attorney, firm, or legal service making the advertisement.
Moreover, the rationale used to support the blanket restriction
on advertising by the legal profession 138—prevention of abuse to en-
sure public confidence—will not serve as a justification for the price
advertising restrictions. Abuse of advertising by attorneys, through the
use of false or misleading advertising or through the use of "ill
means," 13 '1 may be controlled in ways less restrictive than a blanket re-
striction on all advertising—for example, false advertising, by the
Federal Trade Commission;"" "ill means," by the criminal justice sys-
ABA Com OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY note 24 to EC 2-9 quoting from Hewitt,
Advertising by Lawyers, 16 A.B.A.J. 116 (1929); accord, Jacksonville Bar Ass'n v. Wilson, 102
So.2d 292, 295 (Fla. 1958); (2) attorneys would assure success where it could not be realized,
hence increasing "the temptation to use ill means to secure the end desired by the client." Id.
See In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467, 474-75 (D. Md. 1934).
131
	 Retailers, 285 F.2d at 691.
"5 See text at note 122 supra.
135 See text at notes 101.02 supra.
"7
 R, PosNEtt, EcoNONiui: ANALYSIS OF LAW 347 (1973). See generally McInnes, The
Economic Functions of Advertising, in F. QUINN, ADvEwris I NG AN) RESPONSIBILITY 8
(1963).
' 38 See note 133 supra.
' 39 Id.
"° See generally 2 G. & P. ROSDEN, THE LAW OF ADVERTISING. §1 17.01-17.04 (1973).
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tern; or both by a Bar Association Advertising Review Board."' It ap-
pears quite anomalous for the legal profession to justify its own use of
a blanket restriction through fear of its own abuse without that re-
striction.
CONCLUSION
It appears that the Supreme Court in Goldfarb has instituted an
approach to determining the validity of professional activities which
are alleged to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act different than that
used in the ordinary business context. This "professional activities"
approach to section I encompasses two steps. First, the Court deter-
mines whether the professional activities would constitute a per se vio-
lation of the Act under traditional business standards. Then, if it is
found that the activities would constitute such a violation, the Court
further determines whether the activities are sufficiently related to the
general professional goal of providing services necessary to the com-
munity to warrant their exemption from the Act.
Application in Goldfarb of the two-step, "professional activities"
approach to the respondents' minimum fee schedule activities led the
Court to find a price fixing violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The Court determined that the respondents' activities constituted
price fixing under its ordinary section 1 standards and then refused
to exempt those activities since they were not sufficiently related to
the general professional goal of providing services necessary to the
community.
Application of the "professional activities" approach to the legal
profession's price advertising restrictions indicates that they, too, vio-
late section 1. First, it would seem that the restrictions have as an ac-
tual purpose the limitation of price competition, and hence constitute
a per se violation of the Act under ordinary price fixing standards.
Second, the restrictions do not appear to be sufficiently related to the
general professional goat of providing services necessary to the com-
munity to exempt them from the Act. Therefore, the legal profession
would do well to reconsider its blanket restrictions on competitive
price advertising." 2
DOUGLAS B. ADLER
"i See generally id. 42.01 on the concept of self-regulation through advertising
review boards.
14* A special ABA committee recently proposed that attorneys be allowed to ad-
vertise so long as the imormation does not contain a "false, fraudulent, misleading, de-
ceptive or unfair statement or claim." See Goldstein, Advertising is Less of a Taboo Now in
the Learned Professions, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1975, § 4 at 12, col. S. It should be noted
that the committee's proposal comports fully with the result reached through the appli-
cation of the Court's "professional activities" approach to the legal profession's advertis-
ing restrictions. Even if the prohibition of false, fraudulent, misleading or deceptive ad-
vertising might constitute a per se violation of section 1 in the ordinary business context
(e.g., if its purpose were to limit price competition), such a prohibition appears to be
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exempt from section 1 since it would be sufficiently related to the profession's general
goal of providing services necessary to the community. When voted upon by the ABA,
however, the committee's proposal was not accepted. Rather, the ABA voted to change
its ethical code so as to allow attorneys "to advertise in the Yellow Pages or in 'reputable
law lists or legal directories' their office hours, legal education, credit terms and field of
concentration." Boston Globe, Feb. 18, 1976, at 6, col. 5. It is submitted that this
change, although a step in the right direction, is not sufficient to meet section 1 stan-
dards, since the restrictions remain too broad—encompassing non-abusive price
advertising—to warrant their exemption from the Act.
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